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The attempt to combine the contractual interests properly so-called with the restitution 
interest in the Fuller and Purdue three interests model of remedies for breach of 
contract is ineradicably incoherent. Stimulated by reflection on contemporary 
restitution doctrine’s understanding of the quasi-contractual remedies of recovery and 
quantum meruit, this paper argues that the complete elimination from the law of 
contract of the restitution interest, which incorporates those remedies into the three 
interests model, would improve both the coherence of the model of contractual 
interests and the substantive law of remedies for breach. 
                                                                                                                                            
INTRODUCTION 
In the Preface to his Three Plays for Puritans written in 1900, George Bernard Shaw 
asked whether it was now possible to write plays which were ‘better than 
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Shakespear?’1 Those who have some knowledge of Shaw will be more surprised, as 
he himself ironically claimed they would be, that he did not simply profess to write 
better plays than Shakespeare than that he ever raised the question whether it was 
possible to do so. I would neither claim nor wish to have the confidence which more 
than shaded into arrogance that was central to Shaw’s beguiling but exasperating 
character, wonderful creative writing, and in some respects authoritarian politics, but 
it does fall to my lot to summon the confidence to ask a question similar to Shaw’s. In 
my case, the question is: better than Fuller? 
 For if no field of discourse other than the monotheistic religions remains 
dominated by a single figure to remotely the same degree as Shakespeare dominates 
what Harold Bloom has called ‘the western canon’,2 it remains the case that the 
understanding of the common law of remedies for breach of contract remains 
dominated by the figure of Lon Fuller. Over the forty years since what has become the 
argument for partial disgorgement of gains was put forward in Wrotham Park Estate 
Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd,3 the English law of remedies has undergone 
fundamental questioning. If, in light of this, we now seek to markedly improve upon 
that law, we can do so only if we ask if it is possible to go beyond Fuller; to be better 
than Fuller. 
                                                                                                                                            
1 G.B. Shaw, Three Plays for Puritans (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1946) 29. I 
have quoted Sheakespeare’s name as Shaw gave it, in line with his attempt to 
rationalise the English language which was, in my opinion, wholly symptomatic of 
what is objectionable in his politics. 
2 H. Bloom, The Western Canon (New York NY: Harcourt Brace, 1994). 
3 [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch D). Though it is now largely a matter of legal history, the 
development of the Wrotham Park remedy is set out in D. Campbell and D. Harris, 
‘In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the Performance Interest’ (2002) 
22 Legal Studies 208. 
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 The basic architecture of Fuller’s conception of remedies is, of course, the three 
interests model set out in his 1936-37 paper written with his then student William 
Perdue Jr on ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’.4 Though my own 
understanding of remedies remains based on Fuller and Perdue’s thinking,5 it will be 
argued that the three interests model fails to coherently combine the contractual 
interests proper, expectation and reliance, with the restitution interest, and that this 
can be remedied only by the complete elimination of the restitution interest from the 
law of contract to leave a two interests model of remedies for breach of contract. This 
two interests model has the attraction that it brings an essential coherence to Fuller’s 
architecture. However, it is put forward, not in pursuit of coherence in itself, but 
because this coherence has the practical result of improving the remedies for breach 
by placing them on a purely contractual basis. 
  
SOME LOGICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE THREE INTERESTS MODEL 
By focusing on the inadequacy of the relationship of the expectation and reliance 
interests to the restitution interest, I would not wish to be thought to believe that the 
three interests model has no other inadequacies. A now enormous literature testifies to 
the fact that it certainly does, though, of course, to some extent this simply reflects the 
significance the model rightly has assumed. No doubt the way it has perpetuated a 
confusion between ‘reliance’ as a doctrine of liability and ‘reliance’ as one part of the 
                                                                                                                                            
4 L.L. Fuller and W.R. Perdue Jr, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936) 
46(1) Yale Law Journal 52 and (1937) 46(3) Yale Law Journal 373. 
5 D. Harris et al, Remedies in Contract and Tort (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 6. 
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doctrine of remedies is the most important of these.6 But within the doctrine of 
remedies itself, it has been incontrovertibly argued that Fuller and Perdue’s 
understanding of the reliance interest, particularly of its relationship to the expectation 
interest, also is inadequate.7 As it cannot be argued here, it will merely be claimed 
that this inadequacy can be overcome, and must be overcome. Though in my 
conception of the contractual interests the expectation interest is markedly dominant 
in a way that cuts against the ‘scale of enforceability’8 which Fuller and Perdue 
themselves put forward, essentially their concepts of expectation and reliance are 
necessary to our understanding of the contractual interests properly so-called. 
 The inadequacies which attend the restitution interest, which, to state the 
obvious, is not a contractual interest properly so-called, cannot be overcome. These 
specific inadequacies arise from a fundamental logical inconsistency intrinsic to the 
attempt to combine the contractual interests properly so-called with the restitution 
interest, the radically different jurisprudential foundation of which has always made it 
a most uncomfortable, quasi-contractual, graft onto the law of remedies for breach of 
contract. Now, Lon Fuller was highly respectful of that aspect of the wisdom of the 
common law that has as its leading expression Holmes’ famous claim that ‘the life of 
                                                                                                                                            
6 This is the basis of Atiyah’s difficulties with the ‘pure expectation’ award of 
damages: P.S. Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in Essays on 
Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev edn, 1990) 33-34. 
7 eg in the US R. Craswell, ‘Against Fuller and Perdue’ (2000) 67 University 
of Chicago Law Review 99 and in the Commonwealth D. McLaughlan, ‘Reliance 
Damages for Breach of Contract’ [2007] New Zealand Law Review 417. Professor 
McLaughlan regards the reliance interest as ‘redundant’: D. McLaughlan, ‘The 
Redundant Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 
23. 
8 L.L. Fuller, ‘To K.N. Llewellyn, 8 December 1938’ in R.S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1984) 133. 
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the law has not been logic: it has been experience’.9 In his essentially realistic 
conception of the issues, Fuller conceived of law as one of the foundations of the 
‘workable social arrangements’ which he proposed to examine in a new science of 
‘eunomics’.10 He was not much disturbed when legal categories were not neat, either 
in general or in his three interests model, and indeed he and Perdue insisted upon the 
overlapping character of the interests, particularly in respect of the issues addressed 
here.11 Strongly influenced by Fuller’s attitude towards adjudication in contract and in 
legal philosophy generally,12 I have previously perceived, but not baulked at 
accepting, the overlap and inconsistency that is implicit in including the remedies 
discussed in this paper within the three interests model.13 But I have come to believe 
that it is both necessary and, what is more, readily possible (in fact the law has already 
effectively done it) to eliminate the restitution interest from the model of contractual 
interests, leaving a two interest, expectation and reliance model which is a potentially 
coherent conceptual foundation for remedies for breach of contract. 
 This conclusion has been reached by reflection on the implications of what I 
have called the ‘very expensive mischief’ caused by the procession through the law of 
                                                                                                                                            
9 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston MA: Little Brown and Co, 1881) 1. 
Holmes had coined this phrase a year earlier in an overall disapproving review of 
Langdell’s casebook: Anon, ‘Book Notices’ (1880) 14 American Law Review 233, 
234.  
10 L.L. Fuller, ‘American Legal Philosophy at Mid-century: Review of E.W. Paterson, 
Jurisprudence’ (1954) 6 Journal of Legal Education 457, 477. 
11 See n 41 and accompanying text below. 
12 As was the contract theorist who I regard as the successor in significance to Fuller, 
Ian Macneil: I.R. Macneil, ‘Lon Fuller: Nexusist’ (1981) 26 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 219. 
13 See nn 56, 104 and 130 and accompanying text below.  
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contract of the ‘restitutionary juggernaut’,14 by which I meant the doctrinally 
imperialist development of a civil law of obligations originally stated in terms of 
restitution by Professor Birks,15 building on what had been achieved by Lord Goff 
and Professor Jones.16 The gain-based damages which it is still, albeit perhaps with 
diminished enthusiasm, being argued should be extended to simple contract on the 
authority of AG v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party),17 seek to effect partial or 
total disgorgement of the gains the defendant obtains through breach. Such damages 
are, of course, radically different to expectation-based damages, for whereas 
expectation-based damages seek to compensate the claimant and are quantified by 
reference to the claimant’s loss, gain-based damages seek to correct the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant and are quantified by reference to the defendant’s gain. 
In a body of work reaching back to 1999,18 I have argued that the extension of these 
damages to simple contract is extremely ill-advised,19 and it will here simply be 
                                                                                                                                            
14 D. Campbell, ‘Classification and the Crisis of the Common Law: Review of P. 
Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 
369, 377 and D. Campbell, ‘The Treatment of Teacher v Calder in AG v Blake’ 
(2002) 65 Modern Law Review 256, 258. 
15 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev 
edn, 1989). The original edition was published in 1985. The basic argument discussed 
here had been set out in P. Birks, “Restitution and Wrongs” [1982] Current Legal 
Problems 53. 
16 R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 7th 
edn, 2007). The first edition was published in 1966. The current edition under the 
editorship of Professor Charles Mitchell, Professor Paul Mitchell and Dr Watterson so 
reflects the shift to a doctrine of unjust enrichment as to be quite a different book: C. 
Mitchell et al, Goff and Jones on Unjust Enrichment (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
8th edn, 2010). 
17 [1998] Ch 439 (CA) and [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
18 The latest statement is D. Campbell, ‘A Relational Critique of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution § 39’ (2011) 68 Washington and Lee Law Review 1063, 1065-
66, 1092-3. There are references in this article to some of the previous work. 
19 In a recent number of this journal, Dr Winterton has described Campbell and 
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assumed that gain-based damages should not be so extended. 
 A comment by an anonymous reviewer of this paper leads me at this point to 
enter a clarification. My longstanding criticisms of the extension of gain-based 
remedies to simple contract have been of making those remedies (part of) the default 
rule of remedies for breach, which is so inimical to the function of contract that it 
would be impossible unless those damages are made mandatory, for otherwise 
commercial parties would constantly oust the gain-based remedy.20 But in principle I 
have no objection to the parties making a bespoke stipulation for restitution, account 
of profits, disgorgement, unjust enrichment or whatever as the remedy for breach of 
their contract. The Wrotham Park ‘lost opportunity to bargain’ problem arises from 
parties’ failure to do exactly this.21 I have in general repeatedly criticised the parties 
to complex contracts for failing to make necessary provision for bespoke remedies 
when the contract they are trying to make requires them to do so.22 A great deal of the 
confusion from which this area of the law now suffers stems from an attempt to give 
remedies to parties who have not themselves secured contractual agreement to those 
remedies, when the correct contractual response to this should be to enforce what they 
                                                                                                                                            
Harris, n 3 above, as the locus of ‘fierce resistance’ to the argument for gain-based 
damages: D. Winterton, ‘Contract Theory and Gain-based Recovery: A Review of K. 
Barnett, Accounting for Profit for Breach of Contract’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 
1129. The fullest statement of the underlying argument about the nature and function 
of breach is D. Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as 
the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract’ (2005) 11 Texas 
Wesleyan Law Review 455. 
20 Campbell, n 18 above, 1109-14. 
21 ibid, 1114-26. 
22 D. Campbell, ‘What Do We Mean By the Non-use of Contract?’ in J. Braucher et al 
(eds), Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical 
and the Lyrical (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 182-83. 
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have agreed.23 As it happens, I believe that the argument of this paper would lead 
parties never to frame their remedies in quasi-contractual terms, but if they did so 
frame them, in principle I could have no objection to this.24 My objection, or rather 
advice to those parties, would be that this framing would not work well.  
 But, except in a restricted sense which will emerge, gain-based damages are not 
the subject of this paper. Such damages need not, of course, hinge on situations in 
which the gain is the result of breach of contract, and, indeed, in Birks’ extremely 
influential formulations they came to be part of an argument for a law of unjust 
enrichment encompassing the entire law of obligations, into which contract would be 
subsumed. Largely because it was only a part of Birks’ enormous ambition, the 
attempt to expand the availability of gain-based damages for breach has become so 
convoluted that the simplicity of the original argument for this extension, which was 
the belief that breach is a legal and moral wrong, has become rather obscured.25 But 
within contract the argument for such damages initially claimed the purchase of being 
an extension of two remedies the availability and the restitutionary nature of which 
were both regarded as uncontroversial.26 These were the quasi-contractual action for 
                                                                                                                                            
23 For a detailed examination of an exaggerated but nevertheless illustrative example 
see D. Campbell, ‘The Extinguishing of Contract’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 
817. 
24 On the correct attitude the courts should generally adopt towards commercial 
parties’ stipulation of their remedies see S. Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 5 
25 Campbell, n 18 above, 1090-91. 
26 Goff and Jones, n 16 above, paras 20.007-20.023 and S.J. Stoljar, The Law of 
Quasi-contract (Sydney: Law Book Company, 2nd edn, 1989) ch 8. Dr Swain has 
brought it to my attention that recent legal historical research raises a question mark 
against even this claim to an absence of controversy: W. Swain, ‘Unjust Enrichment 
and the Role of Legal History in England and Australia’ (2013) 36 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 1030.  
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monies had and received following a total failure of consideration27 and the action for 
a quantum meruit for goods delivered or services rendered without payment.28 
 These remedies have a jurisprudential foundation in correction of unjust 
enrichment, but it must be added that in their specific case that foundation is, in the 
pellucid terms of Birks’ early analysis of the issues, the restitution of ‘subtraction’, 
because the unjust enrichment of the defendant is ‘at the expense of’ the claimant, 
being the result of an illegitimate conveyance of a valuable benefit from the latter to 
the former.29 Birks’ introduction of the category of restitution of wrongs led to the 
emergence of a very expansive concept of gain-based damages (or disgorgement, or 
unjust enrichment, etc) because its whole point is that it extends restitution after 
breach of contract, originally based on subtraction, beyond subtraction.30 Restitution 
for wrongs is directed at the correction of the abstract wrong of breach, regardless of 
whether the claimant suffers a loss by subtraction. This can cover the case where the 
defendant breaches to maximise gain, the case normally called efficient breach. But it 
also covers the normal case of breach in which the defendant (with varying degrees of 
self-consciousness)31 seeks to make a saving by breaching and paying damages rather 
than continuing with performance. Disastrously for the argument for gain-based 
                                                                                                                                            
27 Hudson v Robinson (1816) 4 M and S 475, 478 per Lord Ellenborough CJ: ‘An 
action for money had and received is maintainable wherever the money of one man 
has, without consideration, gone into the pocket of another’. 
28 De Bernardy v Harding (1853) 8 Exch 822, 824 per Alderson B: ‘Where one party 
has absolutely refused to perform, or has rendered himself incapable of performing, 
his part of the contract, he puts it in the power of the other party to sue for a breach of 
it, or to rescind the contract and sue on a quantum meruit for the work actually done’. 
I ignore as obsolete the various sub-divisions of these remedies which contract 
students of my now venerable generation were perhaps the last to have to study. 
29 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 23-24. 
30 Campbell, n 18 above, 1082-83. 
31 ibid, 1103. 
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damages, as it is impossible to prevent treating savings as negative gains, the savings 
that underlie the normal breach of contract therefore fall foul of restitution for 
wrongs,32 with the consequence that the extension of restitution for breach of contract 
from restitution of subtraction to restitution for wrongs is completely inimical to the 
law of contract.33 
 In the most valuable remarks on contract he ever made, Birks powerfully 
criticised the incoherence of the concept of ‘quasi-contract’34 and wished to expunge 
it from his revised law of obligations.35 In his earlier analysis, having contrasted 
restitution of subtraction to restitution of wrongs, Birks went on to seek to subsume 
restitution of the former under the latter. This was logically possible, though it was 
bound to and did (with other causes) lead to the abandonment of a jurisprudence of 
restitution for a jurisprudence of gain-based damages as, absent subtraction, it is 
impossible to see of what valuable benefit restitution is being made.36 The initially 
brilliantly clear restatement of the quasi-contractual remedies as restitution of 
subtraction has therefore now transmogrified into a somewhat less impressive attempt 
to generally reconceive those remedies as part of a general law of unjust enrichment. 
Except insofar as the argument of this paper makes it unavoidable, nothing more will 
be said about an issue on which I have previously commented at length. 
 But though I have previously accepted the need for restitution of subtraction, 
                                                                                                                                            
32 ibid, 1107-09. 
33 ibid, 1093-1106. 
34 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 22: ‘If cuckoos had to 
be quasi-thrushes or constructive blackbirds, we should know less about them’. This 
analysis survived the restarts Birks later made: P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003) 233; (2nd edn, 2005) 271.  
35 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 29-39. 
36 Campbell, n 18 above, 1079-93. 
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and so have accepted the need for (reformed versions of) the quasi-contractual 
remedies, my reading of the treatment of the leading cases on recovery and quantum 
meruit by those advocating a law of unjust enrichment has now led me to believe that 
the law of contract actually requires no restitutionary remedy at all. I have arrived at 
my conclusion by criticism of the restitutionary juggernaut and this paper is a 
statement of that criticism. However, the full significance of this conclusion lies in 
what it leads us to think of the restitutionary interest essentially as described by Fuller 
and Perdue as an intended complement to the contractual interests. I now believe that 
criticism of restitution of wrongs leads on to criticism of restitution of subtraction, and 
therefore of the restitution interest composed of the quasi-contractual remedies 
thought to effect restitution of subtraction. Our understanding of the law of contract 
would be markedly improved if the three interests model were restated as a two 
interests model, with the restitutionary interest, ie the quasi-contractual remedies, 
eliminated from the law of contract.  
 This two interest model provides a framework for conceptualising remedies 
which is overall superior to that which is implicit in the views of scholars such as 
Professors Dietrich, Hedley, Jackman and MacInnes who have identified many of the 
contractual shortcomings of the restitutionary juggernaut, on whose work I have 
borrowed heavily but of whom I am able to discuss only Professor Jaffey at anything 
like appropriate length. Against a background of the projected subsumption of the law 
of contract into a general law of obligations having lost something of its impetus, Dr 
Priel has recently interestingly argued that that subsumption would have caused the 
loss of a valuable category of remedies which it is useful to describe as quasi-
contractual, and sought a further refinement of the jurisprudence of unjust enrichment 
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in order to preserve a sense of the (quasi-) contractual.37 I am in sympathy with Priel’s 
aim, but I believe that what is required is just the opposite of his proposal: the 
elimination of quasi-contract to leave the remedies for breach of contract on purely 
contractual terms. 
 
RECOVERY OF MONIES HAD AND RECEIVED 
Recovery and quantum meruit distinguished 
Despite recovery and quantum meruit sharing a jurisprudential foundation in 
restitution of subtraction, the English case law strongly distinguishes the two 
actions,38 and is right to do so. Because of the different natures of the valuable 
benefits addressed, recovery and quantum meruit work in ways the differences 
between which are not sufficiently captured by describing those differences as merely 
problems of, as it were, measurement.39 Subject to possible considerations of interest 
and inflation which can be ignored here, a payment of money conveys, of course, the 
valuable benefit of just that sum of money. The description of the action as recovery 
is particularly apposite in this sense, for the same sum is simply recovered. Of its 
nature, therefore, recovery is a practically simple action involving a liquidated sum, 
analogous in this sense to debt.40 
                                                                                                                                            
37 D. Priel, ‘In Defence of Quasi-contract’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 54.  
38 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 109.  
39 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 371 comment a. 
40 As it happens, the attempt to identify the grounds of recovery in Atkin’s Court 
Forms, vol 12(2) paras 62-9 retains a number of antique or absurd distinctions which 
give rise to extreme doctrinal difficulties, but the nature of the remedy sought is 
simple. Recovery is described as quasi-contract tout court and completely 
distinguished from quantum meruit, which is separately dealt with under para 49, 
which takes a similar approach. 
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 However, the nature of quantum meruit is quite different. Some work of 
independent quantification is always required to express the valuable benefit 
conveyed in quantum meruit in terms of a sum of money, and this quantification may 
be very difficult. But, as I shall argue, this difficulty is greatly exacerbated by 
regarding the task as of a restitutionary rather than a contractual nature. 
 First, however, recovery.  
 
Recovery as reliance 
On the basis of the distinction between recovery and quantum meruit just set out, the 
first thing that strikes one about the former is that it should be completely redundant 
in terms of Fuller and Perdue’s three interests model.41 The money paid by the 
claimant conveys an identical valuable benefit to the defendant and so restitution is 
made by a payment by the defendant identical to the payment by the claimant. As the 
money payment by the claimant constitutes a reliance expenditure and so generates a 
reliance interest, and as the payment by the claimant is identical to the valuable 
benefit, this means that the reliance interest and the restitution interest in actions for 
monies had and received are identical. In the interests of theoretical economy, then, it 
would appear that the action for monies had and received could be eliminated and 
replaced with a contractual claim in reliance to identical effect. Of course, if the 
claimant wishes to claim any element of expectation in addition to reliance, it will 
                                                                                                                                            
41 eg Fuller and Perdue, n 4 above, 71: ‘The reliance interest is … generally broad 
enough to cover all the cases coming under the restitution interest’. In terms of the 
general doctrinal argument ‘that the claim arising on total failure of consideration’ can 
be reconceptualised in terms of reliance, I have nothing to add to P. Jaffey, The 
Nature and Scope of Restitution (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 56-61. 
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claim in contract. 
 The elimination of recovery as redundant would yield the very substantial 
benefit of effectively abolishing one of the most muddled and unhelpful rules in the 
law of contract, the rule that failure of consideration must be total in order to generate 
the right for the claimant to elect recovery. The absurdities and injustices which this 
rule is widely acknowledged to generate will not be discussed.42 They have led to a 
situation where the rule is so hedged about that, as Treitel has it, it ‘is now much 
qualified’,43 or, as I would put it, is now lost in its exceptions. However, the 
acknowledged case for abolition of the rule has foundered,44 and the most telling 
reason for this is that such abolition would require co-ordinated reform of the whole 
law of restitution of subtraction. It is, of course, particularly inconsistent (if 
particularly welcome) that it is settled that the total failure rule should not apply to a 
quantum meruit.45 Incredibly to me,46 many advocates of basing the entire law of 
obligations on unjust enrichment are currently seeking to put failure of consideration 
                                                                                                                                            
42 eg Law Commission, Law of Contract: Pecuniary Restitution on Breach of Contract 
[1975] EWLC C65, pt 3. 
43 E. Peel, Treitel’s Law of Contract (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 13th edn, 2011) 
1134. Dawood v Heath is cited at 1133 n 18 as an example of partial recovery allowed 
because apportionment ‘is in fact easy’. 
44 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Sale and Supply of Goods [1987] 
EWLC 180, paras 6.1-6.5. 
45 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 226-234. 
46 And, much more significantly, incredibly to Professor Kull, the Reporter for 
Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A. Kull, ‘A Consideration 
Which Happens to Fail’ (forthcoming 2015) 51 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. I am 
grateful to Professor Kull for showing me this paper in draft. Kull has never shared 
the designs on the whole of the law of obligations pursued by the leading 
Commonwealth advocates of unjust enrichment: A. Kull, ‘Rationalising Restitution’ 
(1995) 83 California Law Review 1191 and A. Kull, ‘Disgorgement for Breach, the 
‘Restitution Interest’ and the Restatement of Contracts’ (2001) 79 Texas Law Review 
2021. See further J. Dietrich. ‘The Third Restatement of Restitution, the Role of 
Unjust Enrichment and Australian Law’ (2011) 35 Australian Bar Review 160. 
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at the heart of their enterprise.47 This will be put to one side.48 The argument here is 
that simply eliminating the quasi-contractual remedies from the law of contract is a 
clearly superior alternative for those whose interest is in the smooth working of the 
law of contract. 
 
Recovery as restitution 
It follows from what has just been said that it is logically essential for any argument 
for the retention of recovery to show that it can sometimes yield a valuably different 
result to an action based on reliance. The only occasion on which this can be argued 
to take place that raises an issue of real interest is that which Professor Burrows calls 
‘escape from a bad bargain’,49 when the claimant may obtain substantial damages in 
restitution ‘even though its expectation (or reliance) damages … would be nil’.50 
Burrows’ principal illustration of this argument is a 1961 sale of goods case heard by 
McNair J in the Commercial Court: Dawood (Ebrahim) Ltd v Heath (Est 1927).51 The 
                                                                                                                                            
47 A. Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) para 15(1). See further A. Burrows, ‘Is There a 
Defence of Good Consideration’ in C. Mitchell and W. Swadling (eds), The 
Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Hart, 2013); F. 
Wilmot-Smith, ‘§ 38 and the Lost Doctrine of Failure of Consideration’ in Mitchell 
and Swadling (eds), loc cit; A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edn, 2011) chs 14-15 and C. Mitchell et al, n 16 above, paras 
12.10-12.31. 
48 Jaffey has made the essential criticisms in a recent note in this journal on Benedetti 
v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50: P Jaffey, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Contract’ (2014) 77 
Modern Law Review 983. I am grateful to Professor Jaffey for showing me this 
casenote in draft. 
49 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 344-5. I put to one side, for reasons of 
space without argument, Burrows’ claim that there are three other possible advantages 
of recovery: ibid, 345-346.  
50 ibid, 344. 
51 [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 512 (Comm Ct). The reported case consolidated two actions 
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best way to understand this escape from a bad bargain situation is to turn immediately 
to the case. 
 In Dawood v Heath, the claimant contracted to buy 44.2 tons of galvanised steel 
sheets at a rate of £73.10s (£73.50p)/ton, giving a contract price of £3248.14s 
(£3248.70p). The claimant successfully argued that the contract stipulated delivery of 
equal tonnages of sheets of five different lengths of 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 ft, but that the 
entire delivery was of 6 ft lengths only.52 The now repealed53 section 30(3) of Sale of 
Goods Act 189354 provided that: 
Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods he contracted to sell 
mixed with goods of a different description which are not included in the 
contract, the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance with the 
contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.  
Under this provision, the claimant was able to accept the 8.84 tons (20%) of the 
delivery which it claimed fulfilled its requirement for sheets of that length and reject 
35.36 tons (80%) on the ground that they were not in correspondence with the 
stipulated sizes and so goods of a different description to those included in the 
contract. This involved a successful argument that this was a breach of condition 
allowing rejection to which I shall return. 
 Given its successful rejection of part of the delivery, then, if the practical 
possibility of the seller ‘curing’ by redelivery of the rejected part did not arise or was 
                                                                                                                                            
arising from two different contracts between overlapping claimants and the same 
defendant. A third party was involved, but, though served, did not appear in the 
proceedings. The precise facts are clouded by these complexities, but I shall treat the 
claimants as one, ignore the third party, and silently simplify the complexities. 
52 ibid, 520 col 1. 
53 section 30(3) was re-enacted as section 30(4) of The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54) 
and section 30(4) was repealed by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 (c 35), s 
3(3).  
54 56 and 57 Vict (c 71), hereinafter SoGA.  
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not acceptable to the buyer,55 the buyer’s natural remedy would be to obtain substitute 
sheets and, if necessary, claim market damages under section 51 of SoGA. But a 
subsidiary fact that makes this case of interest here was that this was a falling market 
and the market price was £70/ton, so, given that the contract rate was £73.10s 
(£73.50p)/ton, a market damages claim could not arise. The claimant not only would 
have suffered no loss but would be able to buy the substitute sheets for (£70/ton x 
35.36 tons =) £2475 4s (£2475 20p), which would be £123.15s 2d (£123.76p) less 
than the aliquot contract price of (£73.10s (£73.50p)/ton x 35.36 tons =) £2598.19s.2d 
(£2598.96). 
 The principal fact that makes Dawood v Heath of interest to us is that the 
claimant had paid for the sheets in advance. This takes the claimant’s possible 
expectation claim out of the prima facie measure of market damages under section 
51(3), the difference between the contract price and the market price, for, having 
already paid the contract price, the claimant would not want to be confined to just the 
difference but would want compensation of payment of the entire market price. This 
complication, which arises from the shorthand way in which the claimant is 
combining expectation and reliance damages, poses no real problem for Fuller and 
Perdue’s model and can be put to one side. But the payment in advance gives rise to a 
problem which cannot be dealt with in this way. 
 For, having already received the payment, the defendant obviously could pay 
the market damages out of that payment and retain the £123.15s 2d (£123.76p) 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Though the English law of sales knows no formal remedy of cure, this is remedy 
(i)(b)(i) (with possible damages under (i)(a)(iii)) identified in E. McKendrick, Goode 
on Commercial Law (London: Penguin Books, 4th edn, 2010) 397.  
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difference. It must be stressed that this is the correct outcome on the basis of 
expectation damages. After performance, the claimant expected to have paid 
£3248.14s (£3248.70p) for 44.2 tons of steel sheets. Ignoring any incidental damages, 
the claimant will have had to pay an additional £2475 4s (£2475 20p) for substitute 
sheets bought at the prevailing market price of £70/ton. Damages quantified at 
£70/ton would cancel out the £2475 4s (£2475 20p) and so put the claimant in the 
position it would have been in had the contract had been performed. Market damages 
calculated at the contract rate of £70.10s (£70.50p) would put the claimant in a 
£123.15s 2d (£123.76p) better position than it would have been in had the contract 
been performed. But by correctly not doing this, an expectation award leaves the 
£123.15s 2d (£123.76p) in the hands of the defendant.  
 This outcome is what Burrows means by a bad bargain and it obviously runs 
against a wish to correct unjust enrichment. Whilst it is in the end unacceptable that 
two different rules yielding two different outcomes may be applied to the same set of 
facts, on this occasion the quantification of damages on a restitutionary basis seems to 
solve the problem in Dawood v Heath.56 This problem was described, in terms of 
payment per ton, by McNair J thus: 
The next point is whether the plaintiff’s right to recover the money which 
they have paid in advance … stands as a claim to recover the money as 
money paid … for a consideration which has wholly failed. The contrary 
view is that the remedy only stands in damages, so that if … the market 
price at the time of delivery conformed to £70 against the contract price of 
£73 10s, there would be recovered on this argument £70/ton and not £73 
10s [£73.50p]/ton, leaving a profit of £3.10s [£3.50p] in the pockets of the 
seller.57 
                                                                                                                                            
56 On my own former acceptance of this argument see Harris et al, n 5 above, 233-35. 
57 Dawood v Heath, n 51 above, 518 col 2. 
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And, of course, given this choice, the restitutionary remedy should be chosen: 
The buyer’s right to recover that part of the purchase price which relates 
to the goods so properly rejected is clearly … the right to recover money 
for a consideration which has wholly failed and which, accordingly must 
be regarded as money paid to the buyer’s use.58 
 Though it is not mentioned in the case, the possibility of displacing the prima 
facie rule under section 51(3) and awarding recovery is explicitly provided for under 
section 54: ‘Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the buyer … to recover money 
paid where the consideration for the payment of it has failed’. But, despite this, the 
choice between expectation and restitution was not, with respect, open to McNair J. 
The merely partial rejection meant that Dawood v Heath should not have been able to 
be regarded as a recovery case because there was part performance, ie there was no 
total failure of consideration, and ‘has failed’ under section 54 should have been read 
accordingly. In order to read ‘has failed’ as ‘has failed totally in respect of part of the 
delivery’, as he did in the passage just quoted, McNair J relied on the authority of a 
number of sale of goods interpretations of section 30(1) of SoGA which he extended 
to section 30(3), and he did not discuss the problem posed by the general principle. 
 Dawood v Heath has accordingly taken its place amongst the plethora of 
exceptions to the total failure rule which constitute what should simply be called ‘the 
sale of goods exceptions’. No doubt this status was conveyed by its being cited as 
authority for the breach of section 30(3) leading to recovery under section 54 in 
Chalmers’ Sale of Goods.59 In one of the leading contemporary authorities on sales, it 
                                                                                                                                            
58 ibid, 519 col 2 - 520 col 1. 
59 This was not stated in the 14th edn of 1963 but in M. Mark, Chalmers’ Sale of 
Goods (London: Butterworths, 15th edn, 1967) 119 n (o) (now M. Mark, Chalmers’ 
Sale of Goods (London: Butterworths, 18th edn, 1981) 183 n (h)). Without entering 
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is now cited as authority for the proposition that ‘in the event of breach of [section 30 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979], the buyer is entitled to recover a proportionate part of 
what he has paid as on a total failure of consideration, notwithstanding that he may 
have accepted and retained a part of the goods’.60 Such a recognition of sale of goods 
as an exception to the general rule is a brazen acceptance of what ultimately is 
logically unacceptable. Burrows is in one sense even more brazen, but it is a 
brazenness that has the advantage of clearly expressing a truth. Taking a line also 
taken by Birks,61 Burrows simply uses Dawood v Heath as one of many illustrations 
that the law in general actually is that recovery is available for partial failure of 
consideration,62 a position which he then goes on to argue is correct in principle.63 I 
will just put all this to one side. If the argument here is accepted, this problem simply 
disappears from the law of contract. 
 Having admitted the plausibility of Burrows’ escape from a bad bargain 
justification for recovery on facts like those in Dawood v Heath, which seem to 
amount to a justification of recognising the restitution interest, it will now be argued 
                                                                                                                                            
into the detail of section 30, Dawood v Heath was unproblematically cited as one of 
the authorities for recovery in the case of a short delivery in Law Commission, n 42 
above, para 51. 
60 J.N. Adams and H. MacQueen, Atiyah’s Sale of Goods (Harlow: Longmans, 12th 
edn, 2010) 137. 
61 McNair J’s argument had been essentially reproduced in P. Birks, ‘Failure of 
Consideration’ in F.D. Rose (ed), Consensus ad Idem (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1996) 187.  
62 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 325 n 42. Burrows, ibid, 325, 344 n 
21 draws attention to DO Ferguson and Associates v Sohl (1992) 62 BLR 95 (CA) as 
a case which is similar to Dawood v Heath. But, with respect and without argument, I 
will simply state that this is not so in one most important respect. For whereas the 
outcome in Dawood v Heath is correct once one accepts the way it was pleaded, 
which is why the case is so interesting, Ferguson is simply wrongly decided. 
63 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 342-344. 
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that that justification has no actual substance.  
 
The effectiveness of recovery as way of avoiding a bad bargain 
The key to understanding Dawood v Heath is to recognise, as Burrows recognises, 
that it involves a ‘scenario [which] will be rare’.64 In fact it is more than rare. It is of 
only vanishingly small importance. It involves a problem which in their seminal paper 
on mitigation Goetz and Scott described as arising from a ‘double lightning bolt’, 
though the precise law involved is different from that which they discussed.65 There is 
only one English authority clearly to the same effect as Dawood v Heath:66 Wilkinson 
v Lloyd, an 1845 purchase of shares case.67 In the US, Bush v Canfield,68 an 1818 
sales case analogous to Dawood v Heath,69 plays a larger role in the understanding of 
the US law than does Dawood v Heath in understanding the English, and it is one of 
two cases70 on which the illustration71 of recovery (reconceptualised as an instance of 
rescission) in Restatement (Third) Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 37 is based. 
But, in a way which calls Dawood v Heath to mind, § 37 describes Bush v Canfield as 
                                                                                                                                            
64 ibid, 344. 
65 C.J. Goetz and R.E. Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 967, 996. 
66 cf n 62 above. 
67 (1845) 7 QB 27. The facts of Wilkinson v Lloyd gave rise to effectively identical 
litigation brought by one Mr Leeman against the same defendant, and Wilkinson v 
Lloyd was treated as deciding this matter as well. Wilkinson v Lloyd was mentioned or 
considered in five nineteenth century cases which add nothing to our discussion, and, 
save for a brief citation (with Bush v Canfield) in Friends’ Provident Life Office v 
Hillier Parker May and Rowden [1997] QB 85, 102 (CA), its subsequent life has been 
confined to the textbooks. 
68 2 Conn 485 (1818). 
69 Bush v Canfield would now be decided under UCC § 2-711(1), which would do the 
relevant part of the work of SoGA, s 54. 
70 The other is Nash v Towne 72 US 689 (1866). 
71 § 37 illustration 2. 
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‘rare’ and its result ‘striking’.72 Why is this the case? 
  Dawood v Heath is and will always be extremely rare because its facts turn on 
a conjunction of two circumstances each of which is itself rare. First, it involves an 
advance payment. Payment on any other terms would have meant that the facts of 
Dawood v Heath could not have arisen, and commercial sales are overwhelmingly on 
terms of payment on delivery or on credit. That this is the case has, of course, nothing 
to do with our concerns here. But to the vestigial extent that awareness that payment 
in advance gives rise to the risk of the seller availing itself of Dawood v Heath, the 
buyer will be loath to make such a payment. In essence, such assistance as Dawood v 
Heath affords a claimant can be nullified by a simple payment tactic.  
 Secondly, the seller breached in a falling market. In a falling market, a seller 
will be particularly determined to perform as rejection will lead to it having to resell 
the goods at a market price lower than the original contract price. The seller will be 
aware that the buyer may take, as it were, the opposite attitude, for if the buyer 
lawfully rejects the goods, it will be able to buy a substitute at the lower price. 
Burrows sees this issue.73 This is, in a sense, the obverse of identifying Dawood v 
Heath as a bad bargain. But Burrows does not, with respect, appreciate its 
significance. Given the advance payment in Dawood v Heath, had the seller realised 
its own goods would not be in correspondence and that the buyer would likely reject 
them, the seller could have bought corresponding goods at the lower market price,74 
                                                                                                                                            
72 § 37 comment b. 
73 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 344. 
74 That the price was lower is compelling evidence that substitute goods were 
available. And if, of course, there were no substitute goods, Dawood v Heath would 
very likely have involved a consequential loss and been pleaded as an expectation 
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delivered them, and kept the £123.15s 2d (£123.76p) difference. As the seller would 
not have been in breach, recovery would not have been available to the buyer. So, 
even in the rare case of advance payment, such assistance as Dawood v Heath affords 
a claimant can be further nullified by a simple performance tactic. 
 In sum, the rule, if this is the right way to put it, in Dawood v Heath is of no 
practical significance and can, it is submitted, be dropped. It can easily be avoided 
and, save in a vanishingly small number of cases, it is. The paucity of authority shows 
that it has effectively already been dropped. With it goes the escape from a bad 
bargain justification for recovery and with this goes this element of quasi-contract in 
the law of remedies for breach of contract. 
 
The consequences of recovery in bad bargain cases 
Though the argument just made disposes of the escape from bad bargain justification 
of recovery, before leaving recovery it is instructive to ask why, if that argument is 
accepted, the seller in Dawood v Heath did not adopt the suggested tactic of buying 
and delivering corresponding goods. The answer is that this was a case of what Goetz 
and Scott, building upon Llewellyn, called a ‘surprise rejection’.75 The issue of the 
remedy, though it clearly was to the forefront of McNair J’s thinking (apparently 
influenced by highly ingenious pleading), was dealt with very briefly. The bulk of his 
judgment does not address remedy but liability. The parties’ dispute was very 
predominantly about the description of the goods to be delivered. 
 We have seen that the claimant buyer successfully argued that the contract 
                                                                                                                                            
claim.  
75 Goetz and Scott, n 65 above, 997. 
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stipulated delivery of equal tonnages of sheets of five different lengths. On this 
interpretation of the contract, a delivery of sheets entirely of one length was a breach 
of section 30(3) of SoGA. The defendant seller’s unsuccessful argument was that the 
contract allowed delivery of one length only. Though McNair J firmly resolved the 
dispute in favour of the claimant buyer – we can recall him referring to ‘goods so 
properly rejected’76 – I believe that any fair reading of the convoluted negotiations 
described in the judgment would show that the defendant seller’s position had merit, 
even if it was wrong.77 There can be no reasonable doubt that, when making the 
delivery, the seller believed it had discharged its obligations by performance. (This is 
why the seller did not itself buy and deliver substitute goods). This being the case, it is 
arguable that the availability of recovery allowed the claimant to react to emerging 
difficulties in a way which should not be encouraged. This argument requires, 
somewhat unfortunately in a paper which seeks to focus on general principles, further 
discussion of the sale of goods aspect of Dawood v Heath.  
 Though the mixed delivery aspect of Dawood v Heath made it a SoGA, s 30(3) 
case in terms of the prevailing sales law, behind a breach of section 30(3) lies a 
breach of section 13, which, though the law now is different as we shall see, in 1961 
read: ‘Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an 
implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description’ (emphasis 
added). Section 30 is headed ‘Delivery of wrong quantity’, and its other sub-sections 
all dealt with delivery of wrong quantities of goods which are themselves in 
correspondence. Section 30(3) was quite different. The ‘mixed delivery’ is mixed, not 
                                                                                                                                            
76 See n 58 and accompanying text above. 
77 Dawood v Heath, n 51 above, 514 col 2 – 518 col 1. 
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because the delivery is of the wrong quantity, but because some of the goods do not 
correspond with description, leaving a short quantity of goods which do correspond. 
Section 30(3) was merely an application of section 13 to the particular situation of a 
mixed delivery when the singling out of that situation, whatever its original 
justification, has long been thought to make no sense. As has been mentioned, section 
30(3) has been repealed, and what now is section 30 is a deplorable patchwork which 
is a travesty of Chalmers’ achievement. But if we put to one side the difficulties 
caused by section 30 and focus on the fundamental section 13 aspect of Dawood v 
Heath, we can see that the availability of recovery in circumstances like those of that 
case is, not merely so easily nullified as to be pointless, but would be unhelpful were 
it not nullified. 
 It has been authoritatively argued that section 13 is itself redundant and should 
be repealed.78 By effectively saying the seller must deliver what it has undertaken to 
deliver, section 13 adds nothing, but merely duplicates, in the form of an implied 
term, the obligation the seller has expressly undertaken by describing the goods in a 
way on which the buyer relies. However, rather than it being redundant, it is more 
accurate to say that, certainly in 1961, section 13 did add something, but nothing 
positive. The duplication was imperfect. For if description was regarded as a matter 
determined by the statement of the express terms of the contract, the consequences of 
a failure to correspond would depend on the seriousness of the breach regulated by the 
                                                                                                                                            
78 eg M.G. Bridge, ‘Reardon Smith Lines Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen, The Diana 
Prosperity (1976)’ in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law 
of Contract (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 348. Professor Bridge’s latest review of the current 
state of the law concludes that section 13 ‘is close to being rendered otiose’: M.G. 
Bridge, Sale of Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2014) para 7.32. 
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distinction between conditions and warranties under section 11 of SoGA. But if it was 
regarded as a breach of section 13 (lying behind section 30(3)), in 1961 a failure to 
correspond mandatorily was a breach of condition allowing rejection, and this is 
exactly how McNair J regarded the lack of correspondence of 80% of the sheets.79 
Recalling the language of section 30(3), it will be seen that that section simply posited 
rejection of the goods which fail to correspond as the remedy for a mixed delivery, ie 
it without question treated a breach as a breach of condition on the pattern of a breach 
of section 13. 
 Once the Victorian sales practices which gave sale by description a defensible 
meaning became redundant so that that meaning has now almost entirely been lost, 
the principal commercial consequence of section 13 has been to give the buyer the 
possibility of treating relatively minor breaches as grounds for rejection unconnected 
with what is now called satisfactoriness or with fitness for purpose under section 14, 
typically in order to take advantage of a falling market. This is the problem which all 
students of sales and many students of the general principles of contract identify with 
Arcos Ltd v EA Ronaasen and Son.80 We know that the goods in Arcos were 
satisfactory and fit for purpose, and so their rejection on the basis of section 13 has 
widely been taken to defeat the purpose of the contract.81 As Dawood v Heath was 
entirely pleaded on the basis of section 30(3), we do not know whether the goods 
were satisfactory or fit for purpose, and even if section 14 had been raised, breach of 
                                                                                                                                            
79 Dawood v Heath, n 51 above, 518 col 2. 
80 [1933] AC 470 (HL). 
81 I have argued that this is so only in a way which leaves Arcos a much more sensible 
decision than it is generally regarded in D. Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a 
Relational Contract’ in D. Campbell et al (eds), Changing Concepts of Contract 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2013). 
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that section was, as with section 13, also then classified as a breach of condition, so 
we would not necessarily have learned how serious any breach of section 14 actually 
was. Dawood v Heath was, of course, decided prior to the changes to the common law 
of conditions and warranties in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha,82 or the replacement of ‘condition’ by ‘term’ in sections 12-1583 and the 
insertion of section 15A into the 1979 Act.84 It appears to be a case where, because of 
(subjective) differences in the understanding of an agreement which was considerably 
and convolutedly altered in the course of negotiations,85 the goods delivered may well 
have been in breach of section 14. But even if this was the case, it leads us to ask why 
the defendant did not, if it did not, offer to cure by supplying conforming goods, or 
why, if it did offer to cure, the claimant chose to reject the non-conforming goods and 
sue for damages as, on McNair’s finding about the content of the agreement, it had 
the power to do under section 30(3). We absolutely do know that Dawood v Heath 
took place in the context of a falling market and would not otherwise have come 
before the court, and this seems unquestionably significant. 
 The suspicion surely arises that Dawood v Heath could have been a sort of 
Arcos case. To be frank, so rare are the circumstances of Dawood v Heath that the 
point is of small or no significance. Nevertheless, it seems that, in such circumstances, 
recovery can be used to bring about the same sort of outcome as the law of conditions 
was used to bring about in Arcos. There is no good reason for this. It is very telling 
that, in a textbook discussion of the classification of terms, Burrows and his co-
                                                                                                                                            
82 [1962] 2 QB 26 (CA).  
83 Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, s 7(2), Sched 2(5). 
84 Ibid, s 4(1). 
85 Dawood v Heath, n 51 above, 515 col 1 – 518 col 1.  
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authors disapprovingly cite Arcos as an illustration of the claim that ‘A party may 
seek to rely on … a trivial breach to get out of a contract which has proved 
unprofitable, perhaps because of change in the market’.86 It is submitted that it is very 
likely (one cannot be sure) that Dawood v Heath is subject to just the same criticism.  
 
QUANTUM MERUIT 
Planché v Colburn 
Though we shall see that his views are nuanced, Burrows argues that the extensively 
discussed possibility of a quantum meruit ‘reversing’ the contractual allocation of risk 
should be allowed when he identifies escape from a bad bargain as the main 
justification for quantum meruit as well as recovery.87 Unlike in respect of recovery, 
however, I cannot avoid at least brief discussion of one of the other justifications 
Burrows gives for quantum meruit, that it is useful in a situation of ‘failure of 
consideration and an incontrovertible or requested benefit’.88 This is the situation long 
associated with Planché v Colburn,89 though Burrows specifically says that that case 
does not belong in his category,90 citing instead De Bernardy v Harding91 as his 
principal authority for this use of quantum meruit.92  
                                                                                                                                            
86 J. Beatson et al, Anson’s Law of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29th 
edn, 2010) 145. 
87 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 347-350. 
88 ibid, 346-347. 
89 (1831) 8 Bing 14. 
90 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 346 n 31. 
91 n 28 above. 
92 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 346-347. I acknowledge there is a 
dictum in this case that is used in this way, indeed I have cited it, but as reported De 
Bernardy does not explain how the award of £12 12s was reached, and I do not think 
it can be precise authority for anything, save for the interest of the question I posed 
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 In Planché v Colburn, the claimant was an author who agreed, for a fee of £100, 
to write a book for a series of children’s books being brought out by the defendant 
publisher. Having lost faith in the series, the defendant told the claimant the series 
was to be cancelled and that it no longer wished to take the book the claimant was 
writing. The claimant had, however, written a substantial part of the manuscript by 
this time. He brought a breach of contract action which, on the best reading of the 
proceedings, was treated as an action for a quantum meruit, and was awarded £50. 
 Our knowledge of Planché v Colburn has been immensely improved by recent 
academic researches,93 the detail of which it is not sought to convey here. But though, 
in particular, Professor Carter’s very illuminating account of contemporaneous 
procedure is essential to understand ‘The Planché v Colburn Line of Cases’,94 
actually understanding these cases is not really now the main issue. What is of 
contemporary importance is that Planché v Colburn ‘has been treated in countless 
authorities as stating a proper basis for restitution for work done at the request of the 
                                                                                                                                            
some years ago (Campbell, ‘Classification and the Crisis of the Common Law’ n 14 
above, 370) of why Birks continually felt obliged to pass off ‘his novel ideas as the 
uncovering of past truths’. An answer to this question must refer to Gummow J’s 
criticism of basing a ‘modern … normative doctrine of restitution or unjust 
enrichment’ on ‘close attention to cases decided in the 18th or 19th centuries’, when 
‘it is a reasonable criticism of much of the modern writing on restitution that it does 
not get the past right’: W. Gummow, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Restitution and Proprietary 
Remedies’ in P.D. Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (North Ryde: Law Book 
Company, 1990) 60. What, in the end, is at issue here is the ‘danger’ against which 
Professor Ibbetson has warned us of too directly ‘treating old cases as simply early 
applications of modern principles, capable of being analysed by reference to current 
understandings’: D. Ibbetson, ‘Unjust Enrichment in English Law’ in E.J.H. Schrage 
(ed), Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contract (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001) 45.  
93 J.W. Carter, ‘Discharged Contracts: Claims for Restitution’ (1997) 11 Journal of 
Contract Law 130 and C. Mitchell and C. Mitchell, ‘Planché v Colburn’ in C. 
Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Restitution (Oxford: 
Hart, 2006).  
94 Carter, n 93 above, 140 
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defendant’,95 whilst it is really no such thing.96 The £50 is obviously arbitrary, an 
equal loss splitting which has been justified as the best one can do when it is hard to 
give a more plausible figure.97 There are obvious contradictions involved in arguing 
for restitution of a valuable benefit when that benefit is unwanted by the defendant 
who obviously thinks it valueless.98 In an attempt to address such issues in a way 
which allowed the type of reasoning identified with Planché v Colburn to be 
marshalled as authority for restitution, Birks tried to set ‘market value’ aside as 
‘irrelevant’ by claiming that ‘benefits in kind have value to a particular individual 
only so far as he chooses to give them value’, the value having to be quantified as a 
matter of ‘subjective revaluation’.99 But this is of far less importance than that the 
claimant should either have been awarded £100 or nothing. 
 Planché v Colburn is a case which, in modern terms, should have been decided 
on normal contractual principles depending on the interpretation of the contract. The 
defendant did offer to take the completed manuscript, and pay £100 for it, to publish 
in a series of books for adults. The claimant, ‘probably the most important British 
playwright of his generation’,100 did not want to have work written for a juvenile 
audience appear in such a series, or be put to the trouble of completely rewriting the 
book. Depending on whether the contract was for publication by the defendant or for 
                                                                                                                                            
95 ibid, 141. 
96 ibid. See also Harris et al, n 5 above, 236-38 and Jaffey, n 41 above, 47-48. 
97 The typical argument to this effect envisages the claimant being paid by royalty, 
which, of course, would be uncertain in the circumstances, arguably justifying the 
quantum meruit and its arbitrariness: Restatement (Second) Contracts § 352 
illustration 1. But Planché v Colburn did not involve payment by royalty but by fixed 
fee.  
98 Harris et al, n 5 above, 237. 
99 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 109-110. 
100 C. Mitchell and C. Mitchell, n 93 above, 71. 
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publication by the defendant in a series for juveniles, the claimant should have been 
awarded the contractual sum of £100, or not have succeeded at all because it was he 
who breached.101 
 The reason why Planché v Colburn, and the other cases cited to similar effect 
such as De Bernady v Harding, are interpreted as they now are is a wish to fudge, 
based on a failure to understand, or perhaps rather to look in the face, the contractual 
allocation of risk.102 Even if we allow that they might be taken out of their historical 
context to be used as authority for modern day propositions about the law, specifically 
for the use of quantum meruit as a remedy for breach of contract, these cases are 
actually but poor value as authority for such use. 
 The sentiment – I think this is the right word103 – that lies behind Planché v 
Colburn is, however, of great current importance because it haunts and makes very 
difficult to understand the most important use now made of quantum meruit, as a 
principle of quantifying damages in many fundamentally breached construction 
cases.104 Because of the breach, it is argued, it may well happen that the payments to 
                                                                                                                                            
101 I understand that it would be even more anachronistic to do so, but Planché v 
Colburn could be examined as a mitigation case turning on whether the claimant 
should have allowed the publication of the book outside of the juvenile series. 
102 I put to one side a realist position maintained by a number of distinguished US 
scholars which I believe is subject to this criticism, but only up to a point. Seeking to 
avoid what they regard as unwelcome limits on the way the rules of damages operate 
to protect the expectation interest, these scholars explore the use of restitution as a 
way of  avoiding those limits: eg W.C. Whitford, ‘Relational Contracts and the New 
Formalism’ [2004] Wisconsin Law Review 631, 641 n 37: ‘A legal realist might 
argue that a judge armed with promissory estoppel and quantum meruit remedies can 
do almost anything she could with expectation damages’. 
103 J.P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1951) 8: a ‘general 
principle prohibiting enrichment through another’s loss … has the peculiar faculty of 
inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock’. 
104 On my own former acceptance of this use of quantum meruit see Harris et al, n 5 
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the claimant provided for under the contract no longer reflect the work the claimant 
has done or the valuable benefit that work conveys to the defendant. Quantum meruit 
seems to be a magic formula which must be invoked in order to move away from the 
contractually agreed price,105 and this becomes particularly clear, as Burrows claims, 
in losing contract cases where the claimant would have had a negative expectation 
from which it escapes by claiming a quantum meruit. 
 Though there is some very commonly cited Commonwealth authority endorsing 
an escape from a bad bargain in these circumstances,106 Burrows also draws on the 
extremely well-known US case of Boomer v Muir et al,107 used as an illustration in 
this connection in the Restatement (Second) Contract § 373 and Restatement (Third) 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 38,108 and discussed innumerable times in the 
secondary literature. Boomer v Muir is treated in this way because its facts seem to 
display so very striking a discrepancy between what could be awarded in contract and 
restitution. As Burrows, entirely typically, has it: ‘the claimants recovered a quantum 
meruit of $257,000 for work on building a dam even though they were entitled to only 
                                                                                                                                            
above, 238-40. 
105 ‘Employ the vocabulary of restitution’ as Kull has it: American Law Institute, 
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Tentative Draft 
No. 3 (Philadephia PA: American Law Institute, 2004) 229. To put the point the other 
way around: ‘we are still asked to believe that the action is non-contractual because 
… centuries ago reference to the contract was taboo’: J.M. Perillo, ‘Restitution in a 
Contractual Context’ (1973) 73 Columbia Law Review 1208, l216. 
106 Lodder v Slowey [1904] AC 442, 453 (PC) (affirming (1900) NZLR 32 (NZ 
Supreme Court)); Rover International v Cannon Film Sales Ltd (No 3) [1989] 1 WLR 
912 (CA) and Reynard Construction (ME) Pty v Minister of Public Works (1992) 26 
NSWLR 234 (Court of Appeal of New South Wales). 
107 24 P 2d 570 (Cal App 1933). 
108 § 38 illustrations 17-18. 
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another £20,000 under the contract’.109 But, with respect, I submit this was not a very 
striking discrepancy, or indeed a discrepancy, at all. 
 
Boomer v Muir 
R.C. Storrie and Co, a construction company of which Robert B. Muir was a partner, 
was awarded a general contract to build a hydro-electric plant. This was a major 
project for which Storrie and Co was to be paid US$7,691,889, approximately $100 
million in 2015 values. Storrie and Co entered into a subcontract with H.H. Boomer 
under which Boomer would build a storage dam as part of the project. In addition to 
itself carrying out other parts of works that would be necessary to allow Boomer to 
make progress as anticipated, Storrie and Co was to provide much of the power and 
materials necessary for Boomer’s works, and to make staged payments to Boomer in 
the way that is ordinary in construction contracts. The work was to be completed on 
or before 1 December 1927. Almost immediately serious disputes arose, which 
considerable modification of the original agreement did not quell, and Boomer 
eventually quit the site with the works substantially built but incomplete on 15 
December 1927. At that time, Boomer was to still to be paid $20,000 under the 
contract. In procedurally complicated litigation involving, not only the partners of 
Storrie and Co, but also numerous third party sureties, Storrie and Co, which 
completely denied liability, was found to have fundamentally breached the 
subcontract by not making progress with the other works and by failing to supply 
power and materials in a satisfactory manner. Boomer was awarded $275,965.06 as a 
                                                                                                                                            
109 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 347. 
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quantum meruit for value of the work done less the staged payments received. 
 There were, it seems, three alternatives courses of action which Boomer could 
have elected to pursue. In quoting the relevant passage of the judgment, each will be 
given a number:  
It is well settled in California that a contractor who is prevented from 
performing his contract by the failure of the other party to furnish 
materials has a choice of three remedies: He may [1] treat the contract as 
rescinded and recover upon a quantum meruit so far as he has performed; 
he may [2] keep the contract alive, offering complete performance, and 
sue for damages for delay and expense incurred; or he may [3] treat the 
repudiation as putting an end to the contract for purposes of performance 
and sue for the profits he would have realized.110 
 It is essential to note that none of these alternatives would give rise to the 
striking prima facie discrepancy between the contractual sum and the restitutionary 
sum for which the case is so well-known. Boomer elected [1] and was awarded 
$275,965.06 on a restitutionary basis. But neither [2] nor [3] would have led to an 
award of contractual damages of $20,000. $20,000 was what remained to be paid 
under the terms of the contract. It is not a measure of the damages Boomer would 
have received had he brought an action for either [2] or [3] on a contractual basis. 
 [2], which, as is common in construction disputes of this sort when the parties 
can no longer work together, was not a practical possibility, would have led to 
completion of the works, and, with the payment of the $20,000, Boomer would have 
received his entire contract price, which would have included the margin of net profit 
envisaged at the time of the agreement. He would then have claimed all his extra costs 
as reliance damages.111 From the reported facts, we cannot quantify these extra costs, 
                                                                                                                                            
110 Boomer v Muir, n 107 above, 573. 
111 The difficulty arises that these reliance costs are in excess of the reliance costs 
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but they must have been very substantial. The part of his whole contract price that 
amortised his anticipated expenditure under the contract plus reliance damages for 
these extra costs would have left Boomer’s net profits intact, and in this way his 
expectation would have been protected.112 But, to repeat, [2] was not a practical 
possibility. 
 [3] was a practical possibility, but it would have been an inadequate remedy for 
Boomer. He would have quit the site leaving the works unfinished and sued only for 
his expectation, if we interpret ‘sue for the profits he would have realized’ as sue for 
his net profits. This interpretation of [3] creates an alternative course of action which I 
will number [3a]. As his reliance expenditures had increased so much, [3a] would 
certainly have left Boomer with a diminished expectation and no doubt in a losing 
contract. This is the contractual outcome most commentators have in mind when 
contrasting it to the therefore superior restitutionary outcome. However, this result is 
not based on Boomer’s receipt of only the $20,000 which remained to be paid. That 
sum features only as part of the contract price when quantifying Boomer’s expectation 
as his net profit. Nevertheless, [3a] is an inadequate remedy for Boomer and the 
                                                                                                                                            
originally anticipated. In a sense, these extra costs are mitigation expenses the 
reasonableness of which must be assessed. But as such assessment is also implicit in 
the very concept of reliance, for expenses incurred in reliance on the contract must 
themselves be reasonable, then, for the purposes of this paper, this difficulty can be 
ignored. But in construction law practice, the claimant continuing to perform in the 
context of a failing relationship can give rise to very serious difficulty indeed, as 
Boomer v Muir itself illustrates. 
112 Goff and Jones, n 16 above, para 20.021 believe the problem in Boomer v Muir is 
that ‘if Boomer had performed or substantially performed his contract, his only claim 
would have been for the balance of the contract price and for any loss suffered 
because of the breach by the defendant of the terms of the contract’. With the greatest 




contrast to the restitutionary remedy which allows Boomer to escape a losing contract 
seems to be, as Burrows claims, a good one for restitution. 
 Boomer’s election of alternative [1], the quantum meruit, will have required the 
court to quantify the valuable benefit that Boomer conveyed. In one sense, such 
valuation will have been independent of the contract price, for, of course, the problem 
was that the dispute meant that the initially agreed pricing scheme did not accurately 
represent Boomer’s actual performance. Given the finding of liability, we are obliged 
to say that Boomer had been put to much extra expense by Storrie and Co’s breach. 
 But the quantification of the value of the actual performance will have been 
carried out with reference to the objective market values prevailing in the construction 
industry.113 When giving detail of Boomer’s increased costs, the court said: 
The jury might well have found that Boomer's cost of operation had been 
substantially increased by Storrie and Co’s continuing breaches. There is 
substantial evidence that Boomer suffered delays and increased costs by 
Storrie and Co’s failure to deliver materials to the job as rapidly as 
required. There is evidence that Boomer's costs were considerably 
increased by failure of Storrie and Co to excavate the cut-off trench as 
rapidly as should have been done. There is evidence that the diversion of 
air from the compressors to other portions of the work and the delay in 
restoring the burned air compressors hampered Boomer and increased his 
costs.114 
 Goff and Jones are right, then, to tell us that the $275,965.06 ‘represented the 
market value of Boomer’s services and labour’.115 I can see no quantification issue 
arising when making an award for these costs that does not arise in any inquiry into 
the reasonableness of contract damages (or mitigation expenses). When a claimant is 
                                                                                                                                            
113 E.W. Patterson, ‘Builder’s Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract’ (1931) 31 
Columbia Law Review 1286, 1299-1307. 
114 Boomer v Muir, n 107 above, 578. 
115 Goff and Jones, n 16 above, para 20.021.  
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put to ‘extra expense’ by a defendant seller’s failure to deliver goods, we do not need 
to invoke the words ‘quantum meruit’ in order to award damages which constitute a 
sum different to the contract price, whether the damages are market damages, 
incidental damages, consequential damages, or a combination of these. It is not so 
much that the metaphysical conundrums of subjective revaluation are avoided by this 
approach, it is that this contractual approach is the only one possible other than the 
arbitrary and unfounded loss splitting exemplified by Planché v Colburn. The 
quantum meruit in Boomer will, in fact, have been a contractual award, although it 
was not, of course, an award of only (what remained to be paid of) the contract price. 
 A purposive interpretation of [3], which I remind the reader was ‘treat the 
repudiation as putting an end to the contract for purposes of performance and sue for 
the profits he would have realised’,116 would yield an alternative remedy which I will 
number [3b]. Under [3b], Boomer would sue for contractual damages which, in the 
end, would represent his net profits envisaged at the time of the agreement, ie net 
profits plus reliance damages sufficient to leave those net profits intact. This does not 
at all appear to be what was meant by [3] in California in 1933. What seems to have 
been meant was [3a], which, as I have said, meant that [1] was superior. In an 
important analysis of Boomer v Muir,117 Professor Gergen has, on the basis of 
something like the argument I have just made, concluded that ‘the law of restitution 
may not be needed to reach the result in Boomer, given modern rules of contract 
                                                                                                                                            
116 See n 110 above. 
117 It was the principal resource drawn upon by Kull in dealing with the contract 
ceiling issue in the Restatement: American Law Institute, n 105 above, 338-339. 
Kull’s thinking on this point was that ‘the proper measure of protected expectation in 
a given case [should] be addressed directly, without resort to the fictions of recovery 
based on restitution rather than contract’: ibid, 340.  
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law’.118 Gergen helpfully draws attention to the rules which may have obliged 
Boomer to elect to bring an action in restitution, in particular the Restatement (First) 
Contracts § 333, which stated that reliance expenditures ‘are not recoverable in 
excess of the full contract price promised by the defendant’. Though Gergen himself 
does not do so,119 I would maintain that, absent these restrictive rules, the quantum 
meruit is doctrinally and practically redundant. Its work not only can be done by 
contract but is done by contract, and though, as I have said, the reported facts do not 
allow us to definitely say this, I am of the opinion this will have been done even in 
Boomer. 
 
The views of Jaffey distinguished 
In a recent paper, Professor Jaffey has added to the argument that the quantum meruit 
should be replaced by remedies on a contractual basis, especially in terms of 
recognising the reliance interest.120 Jaffey says all I would hope to say about the rival 
contractual and restitutionary elements of the quasi-contractual remedies considered 
as a doctrinal question of liability. But on considering the implications of Jaffey’s 
                                                                                                                                            
118 M.P. Gergen, ‘Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled Contractual Waters’ (2002) 
71 Fordham Law Review 709, 714. Gergen goes on to identify ‘the “total cost’ 
method of calculating damages under a construction contract when a defendant 
hinders a contractor’s performance [as the] solution to the Boomer problem’. 
119 Though he generally concludes, ibid, 741, that ‘it is time to do away with the 
general right to restitution on breach of contract’, Gergen would, however, retain 
restitutionary ‘rules that are more closely tailored to specific situations’: ibid. I cannot 
agree with his identification of the situations for which restitution is appropriate, 
which turn on the case for gain-based damages in situations other than restitution for 
subtraction. This is the case I have argued against previously and which I have put to 
one side in this paper. 
120 P. Jaffey, ‘Restitutionary Remedies in the Contractual Context’ (2013) 76 Modern 
Law Review 429, nb 449-450. I am grateful to Professor Jaffey for showing me this 
paper in draft. 
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argument for the quantification of the quantum meruit, a most important point of 
difference between our arguments arises. Jaffey accepts that, ‘when a contract breaks 
down’, a quantum meruit which proportions loss is theoretically superior to a 
contractual measure, but ‘in reality … to give proportionate effect to the contract will 
usually, if not invariably, be impracticable’.121 However, these alternatives are not, in 
my opinion, in reality available, and the difficulties of quantification do not have the 
significance Jaffey believes. Jaffey agrees with Anson that: 
there may be problems in allocating a particular proportion of the contract 
price to a particular part of the contractual performance due from the 
claimant. One reason is that the claimant’s costs may include fixed costs 
incurred at the start; another is that there may be economies of scale that 
would be obtainable from full performance but are not realised from part 
performance.122  
For this reason, he prefers the contractual measure, though this may well ‘over-
compensate’ the claimant, to the quantum meruit, which is not practically available.  
 The implication of the argument of this paper is that there is no necessity to 
make, because there is no real possibility of making, the choice between contract and 
quantum meruit that Jaffey posits. If, labouring under the current understanding of 
damages for partially completed construction works, we move from a contract 
measure to a quantum meruit, there is no magic solution of the quantification issue 
which follows the invocation of this quasi-contractual formula,123 and these 
                                                                                                                                            
121 ibid, 448-49. 
122 ibid, 449, quoting Anson, n 86 above, 596. See further J. Beatson, The Use and 
Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 12-15. For an 
acceptance of this argument in the construction law literature see J. Bailey, 
‘Repudiation, Termination and Quantum Meruit’ [2006] Construction Law Journal 
217, 236-237.  
123 R. Childres and J. Garamella, ‘The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in 
Contract’ (1969) 64 Northwestern University Law Review 433, 443: ‘the valuation 
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difficulties remain identical for quantification which is said to be based on restitution 
or on contract. Jaffey’s effective reversal of the situation brings no improvement, and 
would leave the contract measure unjustifiable as compensation, because as Jaffey has 
it the quantification of that measure is ex hypothesi wrong and therefore effectively a 
penalty rightly open to attack. 
 Though the last thing that can be said is that our current understanding of this 
crucial point is clear,124 it is submitted that, if we relinquish the belief that we need to 
recite the words quantum meruit to release us from being bound to the original 
contract price, we can see that the quantification that goes on in construction cases is 
objective, contractual quantification with values determined by reference to the 
market, with the contract values themselves often playing a very significant evidential 
role.125 
                                                                                                                                            
problem may be at least as difficult in restitution as in contract’.  
124 The leading construction authorities are characterised by ambivalence about what a 
quantum meruit actually is: eg S. Furst and V. Ramsey, Keating on Building 
Contracts (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 9th edn, 2012) para 4.021: ‘The courts have 
laid down no rules limiting the way in which a reasonable sum is to be assessed … 
Where a quantum meruit is recoverable … the work cannot generally be regarded as 
though it had been performed … under the contract. The contractor should be paid at 
a fair commercial rate for the work done … the appropriate measure of the sum due 
[is] reasonable remuneration for executing the work not the value the work to the 
other party’. A telling statement in R. Wilmot-Smith, Construction Contracts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2010) para 3.06 is that: ‘the assessment of 
quantum meruit is usually based on reasonable and necessarily incurred actual cost 
including reasonable on and off site overheads plus an appropriate addition for profit. 
The actual costs can be checked by the use of standard rates and prices from 
publications such as Spon. In any case expert evidence as to market rates may be 
needed’. Spon is a set of costs guides very widely used in the estimation of 
construction contract prices. 
125 In 2008 I taught an LLM course on remedies at the Faculty of Law, University of 
Auckland. One student, Mr Kelly Quinn, a barrister with international experience of 
construction law and practice, submitted a final paper on ‘The Value of Quantum 




Escape from a bad bargain in construction cases and the contract ceiling 
Without wishing to put words in his mouth, it seems that Burrows substantially agrees 
with the argument just made about quantum meruit in the Boomer v Muir type of case, 
but subject to an important caveat. We have seen that in the Planché v Colburn type 
of case what Birks called subjective revaluation played an essential role in 
establishing a distance between the contractual outcome and what was claimed to be 
the subjective definition of valuable benefit. The issue is very significantly different 
in the Boomer v Muir situation, for in commercially important construction cases of 
this type126 it has been authoritatively argued that it is very unwise to try to ‘reverse’ 
the contractual result in the way that is central to the reluctance to look such a result 
in the face in Planché v Colburn.127 The issue naturally arises whether to impose a 
contract ceiling on the award made, and, of course, the literature on this in respect of 
quantum meruit is very large.128 Though one suspects it may have been per incuriam 
because the judgment was itself so preoccupied with the $20,000 as never to bring 
                                                                                                                                            
paper examined, in such detail as the reports of the quantifications allowed, a large 
number of the cases described as quantum meruit awards in the leading construction 
law textbooks, and explained them as effectively contractual awards. This paper has 
had a large influence on the discussion of quantum meruit here. 
126 J. Uff, Construction Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 11th edn, 2013) 166: this 
is a question of ‘the highest commercial importance’. 
127 Goff and Jones, n 16 above, paras 20.020-20.023. Birks, An Introduction to the 
Law of Restitution, n 15 above, 288 originally acknowledged the force of the point, 
but, as Burrows always argued, it was inconsistent of him to do so: A. Burrows, ‘Free 
Acceptance and the Law of Restitution’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 576, 586-
90. 
128 Goff and Jones, n 16 above, paras 20.020-20.023, frame their views with reference 
to what remains the principal review of the literature on the doctrinal wisdom of 
reversal of risk and the contract ceiling, to which the reader is referred for further 
references: A. Kull, ‘Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract’ (1994) 67 
Southern California Law Review 1465, 1468-1478. 
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Boomer’s expectation interest into proper focus, the ratio of Boomer v Muir is that 
such a limit should not be imposed.129 I myself have previously argued for such a 
limit,130 but I no longer think the argument correct as I no longer accept that the 
contractual damages and quantum meruit approaches, though certainly based on 
different, in fact opposed, abstract principles, are different in actual fact. 
 Committed in principle to the position that ‘the cause in action in unjust 
enrichment is distinct from, and need not bow down to, contract’,131 Burrows in one 
sense disregards the contract ceiling. But, acknowledging the force of the argument 
behind it, he tries to partially close the gap between contract and restitution by use of 
objective contractual evidence: 
the pro rata contract price is likely to be crucial in establishing the 
defendant’s benefit … unless one takes the extreme and unconvincing 
view that the contract price is irrelevant … the (pro rata) contract price is 
likely to be important not in avoiding a conflict with contract but as an 
inherent element of the unjust enrichment claim: more specifically, in 
establishing the defendant’s benefit.132 
I believe this is right and I have benefitted from reflecting upon it. 
 The contract ceiling is itself an ultimately unacceptable compromise, and, it is 
submitted, it is unnecessary. Four situations must be distinguished. First, the basic 
finding in Boomer v Muir that was taken to justify the quantum meruit and the 
disregard of the contract ceiling was that the extra expense Boomer incurred was the 
result of Storrie and Co’s breach:133 
                                                                                                                                            
129 Boomer v Muir, n 107 above, 577. 
130 Harris et al, n 5 above, 239-240. 
131 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, n 47 above, 349. 
132 ibid, 349, 350. In my opinion unconvincingly, Burrows, ibid, 350, claims that 
Birks himself took this point: Birks, n 61 above, 135-137 
133 G.M. Cohen, ‘The Fault Lines in Contractual Damages’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law 
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If Boomer had valid claims for damages arising under the contract by 
reason of the fact that his cost of operation had been wrongfully increased, 
it would seem inequitable to limit him to the recovery of the contract price 
upon a rescission for Storrie and Co’s failure of performance.134 
This is often treated as a case of reversal, but it is not. As Storrie and Co caused the 
loss, normal contractual principles require them to compensate Boomer for it. 
 But what if, secondly, if Boomer had himself caused the extra expense by 
inefficiently part-performing the works, Storrie and Co then breaching? This has been 
regarded as the paradigmatic case of reversal. If it was, it would be quite wrong and 
should be prevented. But a quantum meruit would place an objective market valuation 
on the work done, and such a valuation would not acknowledge that a benefit was 
conveyed by the inefficient way the work was performed. It would acknowledge only 
the market value of the work done. This would leave Boomer to bear the extra 
expense for which he himself was responsible. The same result would be reached, 
though on a clearer basis, by a properly conducted contractual quantification, which 
would attribute to Storrie and Co only such loss as it caused. This quantification of 
damages would yield the expectation that Boomer would have obtained by payment 
of the price upon completion of the contract. Neither quantum meruit nor this 
quantification would effect a reversal. 
 Is it different if, thirdly, Boomer had himself caused the extra expense by 
initially underestimating the cost of the works, part-performed incurring that expense, 
and Storrie and Co then breached? This is a difficult case. A quantum meruit would 
have to allow Boomer to recover the objective market value of the work done as 
                                                                                                                                            
Review 1225, 1304. 
134 Boomer v Muir, n 107 above, 578. 
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independently assessed by the court. This would lead to a restitutionary award which 
would not merely be higher than the contract price for those works, but would in fact 
reverse a losing contract. Theoretically, the contractual damages which would be 
awarded on the basis of a negative expectation would not effect this reversal. The 
question which ultimately lies behind debate about the contract ceiling is whether this 
reversal is wise. 
 I do not pretend to have a solution to what is a very difficult question of 
construction law and practice. Estimating the price of complex construction works is a 
‘relational’ contractual undertaking which cannot and does not work by precisely 
allocating risks at the time of the original agreement,135 which is why the standard 
forms of construction contract are predominantly concerned with providing for 
modification,136 why the parties to complex construction contracts typically make 
extensive provision for modification, and why opposition to modification is normally 
considered both legally unsupportable and practically most unwise. As it was 
famously put in Williams v Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd: ‘a main 
contractor who agrees too low a price with a subcontractor is acting contrary to his 
own interests. He will never get the job finished without paying more money’.137 To a 
very considerable extent, concern about the reversal of the allocation of risk 
                                                                                                                                            
135 See the use of construction examples in I.R. Macneil and P.J. Gudel, Contracts: 
Exchange Transactions and Relations (New York NY: Foundation Press, 2001) pt 2. 
This part of Macneil’s second casebook is based on what is still the leading analysis 
of contract planning: I.R. Macneil, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1975) 48 
Southern California Law Review 627.  
136 eg I.E. Ndekugri and M.E. Rycroft, The JCT 05 Standard Building Contract 
(London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2009) ch 6. 
137 [1991] 1 QB 1, 10G (CA). On the crucial point see further D. Campbell, ‘Good 




represented by an original estimate is misplaced as there is no fixed allocation of that 
risk to reverse.138 
 But there is a limit, and the precise case we should consider is, fourth and lastly, 
where a party (let us assume a subcontractor) has (incompetently) given an estimate 
which is inaccurately low and outside of the bounds of permissible modification such 
that the contractor has a reasonable expectation that the price of the work should be 
kept within an acceptable penumbra of the estimate. As in the case of recovery’s 
likely effect on sales disputes over correspondence with description, it is submitted 
that restitution cannot make a useful contribution to the law in such a case. The 
subcontractor should in contractual principle be confined to a negative expectation. 
Whether this is a practical possibility will be moot. Not the least of the issues are the 
hazards of litigation, for in the report of Boomer v Muir even more than in that of 
Dawood v Heath, it is clear that the defendant was completely surprised to be found in 
breach. 
 Whatever the actual facts of construction law in action, in circumstances where 
the contractor did under-price in a way for which it should be responsible, the 
construction law authorities are rightly unanimous that the law should strive to 
enforce the original allocation of risk.139 Quantum meruit will work against this. 
Given the existence of the possibility of reversal by means of quantum meruit, it 
would be most naïve not to anticipate that the subcontractor would seek to gain access 
                                                                                                                                            
138 The necessity of placing our attempts to deal with ‘the losing contract rule’ in its 
relational context has been authoritatively stated in W.J. Woodward Jr, ‘Restitution 
Without Context: An Examination of the Losing Contract Problem in the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution’ in Braucher et al (eds), n 22 above. 
139 eg Furst and Ramsey, n 124 above, para 8.046.  
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to the restitutionary remedy by finding in the contractor’s performance some ground 
for termination. This attitude is the more likely to be influential in leading to a finding 
of breach as the contractor would, ex hypothesi, be anxious to hold the subcontractor 
to the agreed prices. The situation was recognised in Restatement (Second) Contracts 
§ 373 comment d: 
Since a contract that is a losing one for the injured party is often an 
advantageous one for the party in breach, the possibility should not be 
overlooked that the breach was provoked by an injured party in order to 
avoid having to perform. 
Such an inducement to unco-operative bad faith contracting is indefensible. To 
anyone committed to contractual values, then, quantum meruit, like recovery, is, not 
only of far less significance than it appears to be, but, to the extent it is significant, it 
is inconsistent with contracting in good faith.  
  
CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that the quasi-contractual remedies of recovery and quantum 
meruit that were recognised in Fuller and Perdue’s restitution interest and Birks’ 
restitution of subtraction play no positive role in the law of remedies of breach of 
contract. It is very arguable that, if they play a significant role at all, it is a negative 
one. They should be eliminated from the law of contract. If this argument is accepted, 
then it is possible to end this paper on a positive note. For it has shown that it would 
be wrong to believe that the career of the restitutionary juggernaut over the law of 
contract, though this is a most unsuitable terrain for it, has left nothing but wreckage 
in its wake. We can, more than a decade after Blake, see it has left an overall positive 
legacy. By pushing the criticism of the expectation interest paradigm further than it 
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previously had been pushed, it has allowed us to identify what is wrong with that 
paradigm more clearly than we previously had been able to do, and it has allowed us 
to see how to radically improve that paradigm. In the most drastic surgery yet 
proposed for the Fuller and Perdue three interests model (some, of course, would kill 
it off, but this is not surgery), I think we should entirely do away with the restitution 
interest and leave a two interests, purely contractual model.  
 I fear this contribution will be seen to fall a long way short of the pure 
reclassification of the entire law of obligations which the restitutionary juggernaut had 
or has as its summum bonum. Indeed, the contribution is of an opposed nature, for it 
argues that coherence within the law of contract requires us to identify, precisely, a 
law of contract, based on expectation (and reliance). Birks powerfully criticised the 
incoherence of the concept of quasi-contract and wished to expunge it from his 
revised law of obligations. This, it has been argued, we should do, but the best way to 
do it is by, not limiting our criticism to restitution for wrongs and leaving restitution 
for subtraction intact, but by completely eliminating restitution from contract. 
 In light of this, perhaps those impelling the restitutionary juggernaut might be 
thought to have made a contribution to the law of contract akin to that made in 
aesthetic theory by ‘those investigators who have relied upon Reason’ identified by 
Richards, who, ‘though they have sat down without the necessary facts to think the 
matter out, have at least thoroughly discredited a method which, apart from their 
labours, would hardly have been suspected of the barrenness it has shown’.140 
                                                                                                                                            
140 I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001) 
3-4. 
